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Lisbon's Legacy: Increased Democratic
Accountability and Centralized Governance in
EU International Investment Policy
JULIA JOHNSON*

"We need a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members - North,
South, East, West, large, small, old and new. Some of whom are contemplating
much closer economic and political integration . . . . [But] with courage and
conviction I believe we can deliver a more flexible, adaptable and open European
Union in which the interests and ambitions of all its members can be met."

-David Cameron'
I.

Introduction
The Lisbon Treaty (Lisbon),2 which entered into force on December 1,

2009,3 has already changed international investment law and policy in the

European Union (EU). Tellingly, EU and non-EU nations are beginning to
enter into different forms of investment relationships. Such alterations in
investment relationships will extend to bilateral investment treaties (BITs).4
Albeit slowly and inconsistently, Lisbon has begun to alter global investment
patterns both inside and outside the EU by consolidating the EU's
governance structure and leading to the implementation of shared policy
goals.5
Lisbon has bolstered the governance structure of the EU-overseen and
operated by the European Council (EC) and European Parliament (EP)and has begun paving the way for a common European investment policy. A
* J.D., Duke University School of Law.
1. David Cameron's EU speech - full text, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23 /david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum.
2. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
3. European Commission Press Release IP/09/1855, European Commission Welcomes the
Entry Into Force of the Treaty of Lisbon (Dec. 1, 2009) ("The Treaty of Lisbon amends the
current EU and EC treaties, without replacing them. It will provide the Union with the legal
framework and tools necessary to meet future challenges and to respond to citizens' demands.").
4. Sean Cumberlege & Bryan Neihart, Section 23:28 BilateralInvestment Treaty Defining
Investment and Investor, 3 TRANSNAT'L Bus. TRANSACTIONS § 23:28 (last updated Aug. 2018)
[hereinafter Defining Investment and Investor] (explaining that a BIT "protect[s] the investment
of an investor in the territory of a host country").
5. Carrie E. Anderer, BilateralInvestment Treaties and the EU Legal Order: Implications of the
Lisbon Treaty, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 851, 876 (2010).
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common European investment policy, however, threatens BITs entered into
by individual EU Member States with third nations.6
Some non-EU nations may not perceive the consolidation of EU
investment policy favorably, believing that their investors run a greater risk
of expropriation or otherwise limited returns. 7 These nations fear their
investors may not reap the intended benefits of their investments, leaving
them less likely to invest in the future. 8 Time will tell whether a unified
European investment policy under Lisbon will increase investment flows
through Europe and will improve the EU foreign direct investment (FDI).
But perhaps Lisbon's most important function will be to enable European
nations to come together to reach common economic and social goals. 9
It is not yet clear how the EC and the EP will delegate the exclusive
competence granted by Lisbon.o Post-Lisbon, the EU must share
competence with Member States: i.e., Member States may pursue binding
acts only when the EU does not act on a particular issue." Shared
competence restricts the capacities of Member States,12 altering the balance
of power from a fragmented national system to a centralized continental
framework.13
This shift to a centralized framework is likely to shape Europe's
international investment policies. For example, the EP must consider a host
of factors, including a bevy of non-economic factors, in its policy decisions.
Such non-economic considerations are already beginning to materialize in
international investment policies.' 4 Political, moral, and social issues-such
as human rights and environmental concerns, including climate change and
sustainable development-are likely to be featured more prominently in
future extra-EU BITs and in other more generalized investment policies. 15
Given the heightened stature of the EC and the EP, Member States are
more likely to accept and implement these non-economic policies, which
will in turn positively reform extra-EU BITs and develop a more
6. Id. at 875; Thomas Daemen, Why the European Union's Lisbon Treaty Matters to In-House
Counsel, 28 No. 5 ACC Docket 88, 90 (2010).
7. Anderer, supra note 5, at 875.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 873.
10. See e.g., John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, EU Publishes the Text of the Treaty of Lisbon and
Charter of Fundamental Rights on the European Union, 13 INT'L L. UPDATE 220 (2007).
11. FAQ on the EU competences and the European Commission powers, THE EUR. CITIZENS'
INITIATIVE,
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#ql (last updated
Oct. 16, 2018) [hereinafter FAQ on the EU].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Erika Szyszczak, Building a Socioeconomic Constitution: A Fantastic Object?, 35 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 1364, 1366, 1369 (2012) ("The new emphasis upon social values and the role of
solidarity is significant in a global economy increasingly leaning towards neoliberal values and
in a European economy heavily shaken by economic recession.").
15. Id. at 1367, 1388.
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transparent, efficient, and sustainable EU investment policy.16 The
reformed investment structure is also likely to improve relationships
between EU and non-EU nations. 17 These improved relationships may
increase investment flows in some ways.' 8 Finally, due to the rise of noneconomic and other exogenous concerns in investment policy, tensions
inherent in extra-EU BITs that are often biased in favor of host state
investors are likely to be relaxed. If implemented correctly, policy can be
intertwined with investor protection. But the positive effects of a common
EU investment regime will not be realized unless certain steps are taken to
break potential deadlocks and reduce internal policy disputes-political
differences between the EC and the EP may lead to internal squabbles that
reduce the effectiveness of standardized policies. To mitigate this risk,
mechanisms to break potential deadlocks and to ensure consistency in
multinational trade policy decisions are needed.
This article reviews the current state of Europe's international investment
policy. First, this article will analyze the tensions that may arise after the
exclusive competence to regulate investment is conferred upon the EC and
the EP and ceded from Member States. Second, this article will discuss the
relationship between the EC and the EP after Lisbon, reviewing overlaps
and inconsistencies in power, and how the two bodies may jointly alter the
European investment regime. Third, this article will consider the future of
FDI in a central investment policy. Theoretically, enabling EU exclusive
competence is likely to improve investment policy overall, although the
increased prominence of non-economic considerations may increase trade
transactions costs and other negative indicators that might simultaneously
reduce investment flows. Finally, this article will consider public policy
considerations, including how the EU's international investment policy will
affect its relationship with the United States (US) and other nations.
II.

Background

A.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY BEFORE LISBON'S
ENACTMENT

A general understanding of the Lisbon Treaty and international
investment vehicles is necessary to know how recent changes affect
European investment policy. Signed on December 13, 2007, the Lisbon
Treaty supersedes the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. 19 Broadly, the Lisbon Treaty
expands the EP, makes the Fundamental Rights Charter legally binding, and
recognizes the EU as a single legal personality.20 Prior to Lisbon, it was
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id.
Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, at 10, 43; Schmertz & Meier, supra note 10.
Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, at 10, 43; Schmertz & Meier, supra note 10, at 220.
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unclear whether the EU had legal personality, and thus could enter into
international agreements. 21 Article 47 rectifies this ambiguity and makes
clear that the EU acts as a single "legal personality."22 Lisbon encompasses
other broad topics affecting the EU, such as structural cooperation, that will
largely not be discussed here.23
1.

BITs

BITs are often the favored method to govern the relationship between
governments and foreign investors, especially in developing countries where
investor protections are unclear.24 A BIT requires an investment and
investor. 25 An investor may be a private person or company who is a
"national" of the country under the BIT.26 Usually, citizenship laws of the
contracting party dictate whether a party is a national.27 If the investor is a
corporate entity, citizenship will usually depend on the place of
incorporation, the principal place of business, or the place of ownership and
control.28 An investment may include every type of asset invested by the
investor in the host nation.29 These assets may include (1) property, (2)
company shares and stocks, (3) contract claims, (4) intellectual property
rights, and (5) "rights to manufacture, use and sell products."30 Investments
must comply with the host state's laws and regulations. 31 Disputes arising in
the context of a BIT are typically resolved by an arbitral tribunal such as the
21. Daniele Gallo & Fernanda G. Nicola, The External Dimension of Eu Investment Law:
JurisdictionalClashes and TransformativeAdjudication, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1081, 1105 (2016).
22. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union art. 47, June 7, 2016, 2016 OJ (C
202) 1 [hereinafter TEU].
23. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, at 153; Schmertz & Meier, supra note 10, at 220.
24. Andrew Y. Guzman, Why LDCS Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
BilateralInvestmentTreaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 641 42 (1998).
25. Sean Cumberlege & Bryan Neihart, Section 23:27 Bilateral Investment Treaty Typical
Structure of a BIT, 3 TRANSNAT'L Bus. TRANSACTIONS § 23:27 (LAST UPDATED AUG. 2018).
26. Cumberlege & Neihart, supra note 4.
27. Id.
28. Id. See, e.g., Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Poland on the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, signed 7 May 1991, [1992] ATS 10 (entered into force 27 March
1992) art. I, T l(d) http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/163 (defining
"'national' of a Contracting Party" as a "company or a natural person who is a citizen or a
permanent resident of a Contracting Party under its law"); Treaty Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania for the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Lith.-U.S., art. I, T 1(c), Jan. 14,
1998, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-42 (defining "national" of a party as a "natural person who, for
the [U.S.], is a national of the [U.S.] under its applicable laws, and for Lithuania, is a citizen of
the Republic of Lithuania under its applicable laws").
29. Cumberlege & Neihart, supra note 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also M. SoRNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 373
(4th ed. 2017).
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),32
or with the assistance of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).33 Portfolio investments are typically short-term
investments with earnings derived from the acquisition itself.34 In contrast,

foreign direct investment (FDI) focuses on developing long-term economic
relationships between the parties.35
2.

Lack of Explicit Competence Prior to Lisbon

Before the Lisbon Treaty was enacted, the EU lacked the explicit
competence in all of the areas that are incorporated in what is now the
Common Commercial Policy (CCP).36 For example, pre-Lisbon, the EU
lacked explicit competence to oversee "commercial aspects of international
property rights," trade in services, and FDI.37 The EC shared its
international investment competence with Member States.38 Agreements
that were not solely limited to the trade of goods would be negotiated
through mixed agreements of Member States and the EU.39 Prior to
Lisbon, the EC negotiated investment agreements for services, while the
Member States negotiated investment agreements containing provisions for
"investment protection and protection against unfair or uncompensated
expropriation."40
Creating a CCP, with hopes of devising a "common external economic
policy," had been a goal of the Commission beginning with the negotiations
32. Adolfo Durafiona, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2005 No. 2 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
Paper No. 4 §§ 1, 4 (2005) (stating that the ICSID was created in 1965 under pressure of the
World Bank).
33. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., UNCTAD at a Glance 2, UNCTAD/OSG/CIO/MISC/
2017 (Sept. 2017), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osgciomisc20l7-en.pdf~user=17
(explaining that UNCTAD is the U.N. entity entrusted with "economic and sustainable
development issues with a focus on trade, finance, investment and technology"); seealso
U.N.
Conf. on Trade and Dev., Dispute Settlement: International Commercial Arbitration, 5.3
Arbitral Tribunal, at ii, 1, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.34 (2003), https://unctad.org/en/
Docs/edmmisc232add34_en.pdf.
34. Siegfried Fina & Gabriel M. Lentner, The Scope of the EUs Investment Competence After
Lisbon, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 419, 428 (2016); see also Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and
Dev. [OECD], OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment 22 23 (4th ed. 2008),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193 734.pdf.
35. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 428-29, n.76; see also Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF],
Balance of Payments and InternationalInvestment Position Manual (6th ed. 2009).
36. Sean McClay, Note, Can It Leadfrom Behind? The European Union's Struggle to Catch Up in
InternationalInvestment Polity Making in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty, 51 TEX. INT'L L.J. 259,
260 (2016); see also Freya Baetens et al., Determining InternationalResponsibility Under the New
Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What Foreign Investors in the EU Should Know, 47 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1215 (2014).
37. McClay, supra note 36, at 260.; see also Baetens, supra note 36, at 1215.
38. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 428.
39. McClay, supra note 36, at 260 61; Gabriele Mazzini, The European Union and Investor-State
Arbitration:A Work in Progress, 24 Am.REV. INT'L ARB. 611, 613 (2013).
40. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 425 26.
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of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. 41 In 1997, the Treaty of
Amsterdam increased competences entrusted to the EU, but it failed to
achieve "full external competence."42
Full external competence for all aspects of international trade fell short
partly because the 1957 Treaty of Rome was "signed with only six relatively
similar countries in mind," 43 and because it failed to account for the possible
expansion of the EU to include new (and often, formerly-Communist)
Member States. 44 Scholars have suggested that early treaty drafters
intentionally developed an international trade framework of mixed
competence, instead of exclusive competence, because they believed
European nations would likely splinter and fail to reach an accord during
4s
international negotiations.
Competence is the right to engage in certain powers and authorities.46
EU bodies are limited to acting in accordance with the competences granted
to them by Member States. 47 In the international investment realm, it
remains unclear whether the Member States retain certain, or any,
competence for BITs; many Member States believe they may still enter into
BITs.48 In contrast, the EC has maintained that its investment competence is
absolute and exclusive. 49 Nevertheless, under the doctrine of implied
powers, certain competences given to the EU are implied because they
further the intent of EU treaties.50
B.

LISBON'S CHANGES TO TRADE

Lisbon changed Europe's trade structure significantly. Perhaps the most
important part of the Lisbon Treaty lies in Article 207, which "transferred
trade in services, certain intellectual property issues, and FDI into the
41. McClay, supra note 36, at 261; Rafael Leal-Arcas, Is EC Trade Policy up to Par?: A Legal
Analysis Over Time Rome, Marrakesh,Amsterdam, Nice, and the ConstitutionalTreaty, 13 COLLM.
J. EuR. L. 305, 347 (2007).
42. McClay, supra note 36, at 261; Leal-Arcas, supra note 41, at 359 60.
43. McClay, supra note 36, at 261; Leal-Arcas, supra note 41, at 349.

44. Leal-Arcas, supra note 41, at 323.
45. McClay, supra note 36, at 261 ("Additionally, a lack of any meaningful role for the
European Parliament in external trade matters pre-Lisbon created glaring 'democratic deficit'
issues, which would have only been exacerbated if the EU had even more power to conclude
trade and investment agreements."); see also Leal-Arcas, supra note 41, at 349.
46. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 5(1) (2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012

Oj. (C 326) 1, 18.
47. Id. at 5(2).
48. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 429; see also Council of the European Union Press

Release, Conclusions on a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy § 2, 9
(Oct. 25, 2010).

49. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 430 31.
50. Id. at 431.
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CCP."'51 For the first time, "the CCP [has been] explicitly embedded into a
broader framework of EU external relations law" under Lisbon.52
Accordingly, Lisbon entrusted the EU with negotiating treaties pertaining
53
to FDI.
The Lisbon Treaty explicitly expands upon existing policy objectives in
areas of climate change and the environment, energy and sustainable
development, health care, labor laws, and privacy.54 Although previous
European treaties attempted similar policy objectives, Lisbon has granted
the EU more concrete and specific mechanisms to achieve diverse policy
goals.55 Nevertheless, Member States did not relinquish all governance
authority under Lisbon. Indeed, many prominent aspects of governance,
such as taxation, remain exclusively under the control of Member States.56
This shift in competence for foreign investment to the EU gives proof of a
growing trend to increase investment protections with the hope that these
57
efforts will increase cross-border investments.
C.

THE TRANSFER OF EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE TO THE EC AND

THE EP

By transferring competence to the EC and the EP, the drafters of the
Lisbon Treaty intended for the EU investment policy to operate as a
regional unit, thereby diminishing fragmentation between investment
policies between individual Member States.58 Such intent is expressed in the
EU's governance structure. 59
Many of the Lisbon Treaty's policies pertaining to investment and trade
policy are found in the amended Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). Articles 3 and 207(1) of the TFEU give the EC and the EP
the exclusive competence to oversee the CCP,60 allows the EC to control the
monetary policy of those Member States using the euro, and grants the EC
the power to develop competition rules required for the internal market to
function effectively.61 Moreover, Article 207 of the TFEU incorporates FDI
51. Id. at 216; McClay, supra note 36, at 261; see also Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, at 92.
(This provision has been incorporated into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.).
52. McClay, supra note 36, at 261; Boris Rigod, "Global Europe": The EUs New Trade Policy in
its Legal Context, 18 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 277, 297 (2012).
53. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 421.
54. Daemen, supra note 6, at 93.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 421.
58. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, at 18.
59. See id.
60. Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Competence in International Trade After the Treaty of

Lisbon, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 639, 645 (2011).
61. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 3,
119, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 51 [hereinafter TFEU] (Additionally, TFEU's Article
63 bars restrictions of all types placed on movement of capital between EU nations as between
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into the CCP overseen by the EU.62 The CCP establishes uniform
principles for changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade
agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial
aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement
of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy, and measures to
protect trade such as those taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.63
TFEU's reference to the CCP encompasses the EU's jurisdiction over
FDI, which includes extra-EU BITs.64 Furthermore, Article 294 of the
TFEU increases the EP's power, which allows for a shared decision feature
with the EC-or "ordinary

legislative procedure"-over

the

CCP.65

Therefore, this provision effectively shifts the control center for investment
regulations out of the dominion of the Member States and grants this right
to the EC and the EP.66 This renders the "shared competence" model
obsolete, which had previously allowed the Member States and the EU to
7
share control over international investment.6
Other provisions of the TFEU also demonstrate the shift to a centralized
system of shared powers for the EU. For example, Article 308 calls for the
creation of a European Investment Bank-of which the Member States are
participants-that finances projects for areas lacking such resources, in turn,
modernizing the domestic market and funding common interest projects.68
Furthermore, Article 28 provides for "the adoption of a common customs
tariff in .

.

. relations with third countries," so as to promote the free and

open transfer of goods.69 In addition, Article 127 of the TFEU provides for
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to be given responsibility to
"define and implement the monetary policy of the Union."70 Consequently,
the groundwork for an EU-wide investment policy is effectively laid through
both EU and non-EU nations.: BITs often exist to guarantee the enforcement of this
provision.).
62. Id. art. 207.
63. Id.; see also Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. III-315, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004
OJ. (C 310) 1,142 (matching the exact wording of the Constitutional Treaty's Article III-315
provision); see also Devuyst, supra note 60, at 653.
64. TFEU, supra note 61, art. 207.
65. Id. art. 289, 294; see also Stephanie Schacherer, Can EU Member States Still Negotiate BITS
With Third Countries?, NV. TREATY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016), www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/caneu-member-states -still-negotiate- bits -with-third-countries-stefanie -schacherer. Fortunately
for investors, BITs entered into prior to Lisbon's ratification are likely to remain valid after the
Member States reconcile any legal incompatibilities, even if some reconciliation may need to be
undertaken between intra-EU BITs and extra-EU BITs, and transitional steps may need to be
implicated in order to bridge any dissonance between extra-EU BITs prior to Lisbon's
ratification.
66. Fina & Lentner, supra note 34, at 421.
67. Id.
68. TFEU, supra note 61, art. 308.
69. Id. art. 28.
70. Id. art. 28(2); see also Ralph H. Folsom, International Business Transactions § 28.14 (ed.
2017) ("[U]nder Lisbon, the European Central Bank was officially designated an EU
institution.").
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multiple mechanisms designed to redirect the focus of EU investment
control, while also providing for the creation of supplementary institutions
such as the Bank to legitimize this control.71
Article 206 also fosters a liberal, open trade policy by removing
"restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment [and]
lowering customs, and limiting other investment barriers."72 In the
aggregate, the Lisbon Treaty liberalizes trade policies and promotes the
openness of trade flows between EU and non-EU nations.73 As discussed
below, these factors can positively affect FDI and extra-EU BITs unless they
are thwarted by internal tension between Member States and the governing
bodies.

III. Analysis
A.

TENSIONS BETWEEN EU MEMBER STATES MAY ARISE BASED ON
DIFFERING NEEDS

Changes to European investment policy may increase tensions between
EU Member States where issues affecting their populations, environments,
and economies differ. Member States often disagree on a variety of
provisions regarding dispute settlement, redefining the parties who may
enter into an investment; what an investment encompasses; the parameters
of sustainable business practices; and social and moral implications.74 A shift
to an EU-centric competence does not eradicate these issues. Moreover,
drafting regional BITs means that individual nations will lose the ability to
craft BITs tailored to the unique concerns affecting that nation.71 But the
core changes made to future extra-EU BITs will recognize essential human
rights standards, the rights of laborers, environmental protections (from
industrial waste, for example), and a political policy dimension.76 After
Lisbon, general essential rights take precedence over the idiosyncratic needs
of individual nations.77
71. Anderer, supra note 5, at 880.

72. TFEU, supra note 61, art. 206.
73. Id. art. 351 (explaining that extra-EU BITs concluded before January 1, 1958, are not
affected by the TFEU).
74. Nikos Lavranos, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and EU Law, ESIL Conference 5
(Sep. 28, 2010).

75. Id.
76. Anne Pollet-Fort, EU Ctr. in Singapore, Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on EU External
Trade Poliy, at 2 3, 2 Background Brief (Mar. 2010), http://aei.pitt.edu/33652/1/
LisbonlmpactonTrade-rev6Mar.pdf. ("The enhanced role of the [European Parliament] will
also increase the possibility of having non-economic objectives such as human rights and social
standards issues being included in future trade agreements.").
77. Id. at 13.
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Lisbon May Reduce the Ability of Weaker EU Nations to Shape Their
Individual Investment Policy

Post-Lisbon, Member States are limited in their ability to draft individual
investment policies. 78 The shared competence model previously allowed for
substantially more policy power and a more active role by the individual
nations in developing an investment policy consistent with the unique needs
of the state, including human rights, workforce, and other non-economic
considerations. 79 While the intended effect of Lisbon is to provide for a
synthesized Europe acting as a single body, a corresponding consequence is
that Member States no longer have the capacity to shape investment policies
in light of their special circumstances.so But the interests of the EU
generally and the interests of Member States specifically may be mutually
exclusive in certain circumstances.sI For instance, while smaller or weaker
EU states may struggle to attract FDI into their borders, larger EU nations
may not encounter such difficulties.82 Without a compensatory mechanism,
weaker EU states may not receive equal investment protections and
incentives compared to a European heavyweight, thereby furthering
economic equalities in Europe.83
Monetary crises illustrates one harm that can befall a nation that cannot
control its own policy.84 For example, if a nation is encountering an
economic slowdown, it often utilizes monetary policy to help prevent the
78. Frank Schorkopf, Case Nos. 2 BE 2/08, 2 BVE 5/08, 2 BVR 1010/08, 2 BVR 1022/08, 2 BVR
1259/08, and 2 BVR
182/09. 123 BVERFGE 267 (2009), http://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany), June 30, 2009, 104 A. J. INT'L L. 259, 262 (2010) (The German Court specified
that certain rights are reserved to the individual state, and it held that "[b]eyond this specific
authority already transferred to the EU, the Court defined certain domestic rights concerning
,the political formation of economic, cultural and social circumstances' with which European
unification shall not substantially interfere.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Matthias Niedobitek, The Lisbon Case of 30 ]une 2009-4 Comment from the European Law
Perspective, 10 GERMAN L. J. 1267, 1268 (2009) ("[T]he required involvement of the German
parliament in the adoption of Union acts can conflict with the necessary 'responsiveness to the
needs of European integration' . . . of the German federal state."); see generally MATTHAS
NIEDOBITEK, ZUR "EuROPATAUGLICHKEIT"
FODERALISMUSREFORM,

EUROPAISCHE

DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESSTAATES NACH DER

FORSCHUNGSPERSPEKTVEN:

ELEMENTE

EINER

[On the "European Opportunity" of the German Federal State after
the Federalism Reform, in European Research Perspective Elements of a European Science]
201 (Peter Jurczek & Matthias Niedobitek eds., 2008).
82. Communication from the Commission: Annual Growth Survey 2012, at 8 9, COM/201 1/
0815 final.
EUROPAWISSENSCHAFT

83. See, e.g., Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Statistics Explained, EUROSTAT (July 9, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign-direct-investment
flows.

84. Id.
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economy from contracting excessively or to buffer a recession.85 But if a
weaker EU nation is experiencing an economic slowdown, while the rest of
the EU is not in a comparable situation, the EU monetary policy may not
mitigate its effects upon a single smaller Member.86 Instead, the weaker
nation has fewer remedies to mitigate the effects of an economic downturn
and may need outside assistance.87 Such a scenario could occur in an
international investment framework, where a smaller nation struggling to
attract inward investment from foreigners will continue to lag farther behind
other EU Member States. Weaker nations would have fewer policy tools
to attract investment more cheaply and efficiently than their competitor
stronger nations. 89 Consequently, balancing the rights of the Member States
and the interests of the community as a whole will require delicate balancing
so as not to bypass the needs of weaker nations in favor of stronger nations.90
Furthermore, scenarios may arise in which a Member State and the EU
disagree on a particular policy matter, such as when a Member State desires
investment in a non-EU nation, but the EU does not acquiesce. For
example, conflict may arise when the EU does not approve an investment
with a nation on an issue relating to non-economic grounds (such as
genocide or violations of a disarmament pact). Though liberalization of
trade and investment is a component of international law under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),9' the EU may choose to curtail a
BIT between a nation whose actions it does not approve out of moral or
social concerns, thus escalating tensions between the EU Member States and
the EU.92 Thus, a Member State seeking to foster relations with a non-EU
state may be restrained in its capacity to act separately from the EU, and this
may prevent the autonomy of Member States to secure national interests. 93
Conversely, as noted above, any Member State's diminished autonomy will
be counter-balanced by increased transparency and efficiency. Member
85. John C. Williams, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Speech at the World
Affairs Council: Supporting Strong, Steady, and Sustainable Growth (April 6, 2018).
86. Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Statistics Explained, supra note 83.

87. Id. (Greece has experienced instability due to an unsustainable monetary policy instigated
in order to join the European currency.); see generally Recommendation for a Council
Recommendation on Greece's 2012 National Reform Programme, COM/2012/307 final.
88. Catching Up Regions, EUR. COMM., http://ec.europa.eu/ regional-policy/en/policy/how/
improving-investment/lagging regions/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018); see also Thomas Farole &
Soraya Goga, 5 Things You (Probably) Didn't Know About the EU's "Lagging Regions", WORLD
BANK: EURASIAN PERSPECTIVES

(Dec. 12, 2017), http://blogs.worldbank.org/europeandcentral

asia/print/5-things-you-probably-didn-t-know-about-eu-s-lagging-regions.
89. See Caroline Galvan, The Top 10 Most Competitive Economies in Europe, WORLD ECON. F.
(Sept. 30, 2015), www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/09/the -top- 10-most-competitive-economiesin-europe.
90. Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Statistics Explained, supra note 83.
91. Id.

92. Vincent Depaigne, Protectingfundamental rights in trade agreements between the EU and third
countries, 42 E.L. REv. 562, 575 (2017).
93. Id.
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States will have additional diplomatic channels through which to foster
94
relations with non-EU nations.
In addition, investment policies that are most effective for one nation's
enterprises may not correspondingly be best for another nation, making it
difficult for the EC and the EP to balance the demands of all Member States
when making investment policy decisions.95 Instead, the overall EU
investment policies may be skewed in favor of the stronger EU nations,
which often dominate the political agenda.96 Because stronger EU nations
also often possess the greater FDI flows, it makes economic sense for the EU
97
to develop its policies addressing the concerns of its stronger nations.
Unfortunately, in diminishing the needs of its smaller or weaker states, the
EU may hinder the economic development of these nations.98 This becomes
especially relevant as Eastern European nations increasingly seek to enter
99
the EU.
These nations, many of them former members of the Soviet
Union, may need special provisions or policies to spur re-development. 100
On the other hand, though weaker Member States may be restricted from
conducting BITs on their own, it is possible that any detriment is offset by
the EC's ability to provide a stable investment platform, increasing overall
investment opportunities for these nations, which independently may have
fostered an unattractive investment climate. 10 Thus, efforts to promote
cooperation between the EU and its Member States should be made so
considerations peculiar to weaker nations may be acknowledged and
implemented.02
Developing accommodations for weaker nations is also in line with the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).03 For example, Article
IV(3) provides that "[p]articular account shall be taken of the serious
94. Id.
95. See generally Wenhua Shan & Sheng Zhang, The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a
Common Investment Polhy, 21 E.J. OF INT'L L. 1049 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chq 71.
96. See generally Sophie Meunier, Integration by Stealth: How the European Union Gained
Competence over Foreign Direct Investment, 55 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 593 (2017), https://
doi.org/10.1 111/jcms. 12528.
97. Id.
98. See Single Market Integration and Competitiveness in the EU and its Member States
2016, EuR. COMM'N (Nov. 21, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/single-market-inte
gration-and-competitiveness-eu-and-its-member-states-2016 en [hereinafter Competitiveness
in the EU and its Member States]; Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Statistics Explained, supra
note 83.
99. See generally Countries, EuR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/coun
tries-en) (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
100. See Mark Rice-Oxley et al., End of the USSR: Visualizing How the Former Soviet Countries
Are Doing, 20 Years On, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 17, 2011, www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/
201 /aug/17/ussr-soviet-countries-data.
101. See Competitiveness in the EU and its Member States, supra note 98.
102. See id.
103. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 4 5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 J.L.M. 1167
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
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difficulty of the least-developed countries in accepting negotiated specific
commitments in view of their special economic situation and their
development, trade and financial needs."104 Such a provision suggests that
concerted action to consider the needs of under-developed nations is vital to
increase the EU's economic prosperity and to prevent stronger EU nations
from dominating international investment.105
Though the loss of powers by the Member States necessarily leads to the
relinquishment of certain rights, Lisbon also enables the EU, albeit
exclusively, to develop an international investment policy in, a consistent and
cohesive manner. 06 Such a cohesive investment platform benefits not only
EU investors, but also non-EU investors. Instead of dealing with haphazard
and confusing obligations to invest in neighboring nations, 07 now, the noninvestors can count on "legal certainty .. .[for] investors operating under
the terms of these agreements."os This shift in power to the EU's "control
nucleus" is likely to promote a stable and fair trading network, even if the
EU must still ensure that its international investment policy represents the
needs of individual Member States and the region as a whole.09
2.

Will Tensions Between the EC and the EP after Lisbon Lead to
Increased Democratic Accountability?

Secondly, while Lisbon shifts the investment regime from a system of
shared competence between the individual Member States to the co-decision
powers of the EC and the EP,I0 the scope of these rights is ambiguous and
could lead to confusion or divergence from core EU interests.",
Conversely, allowing the EP a role in investment negotiations, by effectively
instilling the EP with a veto capacity, is likely to result, in the aggregate, in
the EU investment regime becoming more democratic and more
accountable to the EU people.112 Nonetheless, the environment is ripe for
tensions to develop between the EC and the EP as they attempt to define the
scope of the rights and responsibilities conferred upon them under
Lisbon."3 The next section will discuss the potential tensions that may arise.
104. Id. art. IV(3).
105. See id.
106. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Towards a
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, at 2, 4 COM/2010/343 final
[hereinafter Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 4, 11.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Anderer, supra note 5, at 864.
112. Id. at 854.
113. Id.
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3. A Dispute Settlement Mechanism is Necessary to Break Conflicts
In addition to conflicts between the Member States, conflicts may also
arise between the EC and the EP. An effective dispute settlement
mechanism is lacking."4 Moreover, the EP, imbued with new authorities
under Lisbon, may be influenced by the Member States to a greater extent
than previously; for example, by soliciting recommendations or other inputs
from the Member States." 5 By giving Member States a greater role in the
EP, key decisions could better reflect the needs of the Member States.116
As described previously, prior to Lisbon, the EP possessed only a very
limited role in EU investment policy and was effectively excluded from
negotiations regarding BITs and other trade negotiations with non-EU
nations." 7 Instead, the Member States, along with the EC, possessed this
role and the EC was formally in charge of instigating trade negotiations and
proposing such endeavors to the Council of Ministers." 8 The EC would
then enter into negotiations with third nations and the Member States." 9
Upon agreement and formal signature, the EC would then authorize the
document.120 The EP's opinion was rarely sought or considered.121
At times, the EP played a vital role in deciding key issues, such as in the
event of a substantial budget consideration and the creation of new
institutional arrangements affecting the EP.122 But for the most part, prior
to Lisbon, the EP retained little voice on trade and investment matters, even
if it was not completely barred from influencing trade decisions.123 But even
when the EP had input, the EP's approval was rarely compulsory, leaving
the EP with little power to shape the EU investment policy with non-EU
nations.124 Thus, the EC and the Member States maintained responsibility
for creating BITs and otherwise forging the future of EU international
25
investment.
The Lisbon Treaty shifted this balance of power. Post-Lisbon, the EC
and the EP have become co-decision-makers on issues pertaining to CCP.126
Article 207 of the TFEU provides that "the European Parliament and the
Council ...in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure ... shall
adopt the measures . . . for implementing the common commercial
114. Id. at 855.
115. Id. at 881.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 854.
118. Id. at 855.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 863.
121. Id.
122. See Ronnie Downes et al., Budgeting and Performancein the European Union: A review in the
context of EU Budget Focused on Results, 2017 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 1, 33 (2017).
123. Eur. Comm'n Press Release, Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon, Brussels (Dec. 1, 2009).
124. See id.
125. Anderer, supra note 5, at 857.
126. Id. at 873.
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policy."12 7

The EC and the EP must also keep each other regularly
informed. In addition to instilling effective legislative and veto power, the
EC President must "present a report to the [EP] after the meetings of the
[EC]."128 Moreover, the EC High Representative must "regularly consult"
with the EP regarding its "basic choices" in order to "ensure that the views
of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration."129 Finally,
the EP has been granted the right to supervise the implementation of trade
measures, thus ensuring that the EP's opinions are actually heeded.130
Although the TFEU broadly shifts the control nucleus away from
Member States,'3' that is unlikely to be the most controversial and turmoilridden provision. It may instead take a backseat to the effects of a potential
conflict between the EC and the EP.132 Post-Lisbon, before any extra-EU
investment agreement may come into existence, it must first be approved by
the EP.33 Consequently, the EP's approval now becomes mandatory for an
investment agreement to become effective. 134 On the other hand, the EC
retains the power to enter into trade negotiations because, while the EP
must approve investment agreements, it defers to the EC to enter into
negotiations. 35 As a result, the EP must agree with the terms of the
agreement early in the process to avoid a delay.136 In regards to how the
change to qualified majority voting will shift decisions, the individual
personalities of the EC and the EP may come to take a larger role in the
decision-making process, thus politicizing the process in a way that Lisbon's
137
drafters never intended.
127. TFEU, supra note 61, art. 207.
128. 2012 TEU supra note 46, art. 15(6)(d).
129. Id. art. 36.
130. Id. at 860-61, 868-69 (there is often little to no relationship between a nation's investment
policies and its national policies as a whole this "interconnect" is missing); Pollet-Fort, supra
note 76, at 11, 15 (the current international investment regime is comprised of thousands of
individual treaties; a central aim as government policies merge with investment should be to
restore this connection); Anderer, supra note 5, at 856 (leading to complexity, gaps, and
ambiguity in coverage); see generally Schacherer, supra note 65 (arbitration awards are often
found to be unpredictable).
131. Schorkopf, supra note 78, at 262 ("The Court held that to avoid imminent
unconstitutionality the EU must cautiously exercise any new or expanded power brought by the
Lisbon Treaty ratification. The Court asserted that [Miember [S]tates must maintain their
right to control the legal and practical 'precondition of a living democracy."').
132. See TFEU, supra note 61, art. 294. A wrestling for power may result from the co-decision
making between the EC and the EP (art. 294(2)) and from the qualified voting mechanism of
the "ordinary legislative procedure" (art. 294(8)). It is unclear how these two provisions will
shift the outcome of key investment decisions and, thus, pave the way for a potential conflict
between these entities; see also Anderer, supra note 5,at 875.
133. Anderer, supra note 5, at 879.
134. Id.
135. Pollet-Fort, supra note 76, at 5 ("This means that the opinion of the EP becomes essential
and this even before the initiation of any future trade negotiations if one wants to avoid the risk
of having the entirety of the agreement blocked by the EP.").
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 2.
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Under Article 207 of the TFEU, the EP has been imbued with a steadfast
veto power. If the EP does not agree with an investment agreement, it may
effectively block its passage. 138 But the EP may only make the decision as to
whether to approve or deny an investment agreement wholesale, and
therefore the EP still cannot mandate changes to the agreement unless it
provides its recommendations. Practically, this means the EC continues to
hold greater power than the EP. Further, it is conceivable that EP will
presuppose that the investment is generally a beneficial endeavor, and
therefore the EP may be inclined to accept the provision on balance, even
though the EP does not agree with all facets of the proposal.139 The EP may
be especially likely to wield its veto power when certain key non-economic
provisions of an investment agreement are at issue.140 Consequently, it may
be difficult to predict in advance when the EP may block an agreement,
thereby increasing investor uncertainty.'4'
4.

Enactment of a Line-by-Line Veto EP Power Would Reduce Delays

Due to the conflicts described above, the rights conferred to the EP by
Article 207 would have been more effective if the EP had been granted a
line-by-line or otherwise nuanced veto power, thus equalizing the EP's role
with the EC. Unnecessary delays in the execution of trade and investment
agreements may harm relationships with third nations and diminish extraEU trade.42 Without changes to this structure, all investment negotiations
may come to a halt due to a deadlock based on a particular political or
economic issue. 143 In turn, investment flows would be reduced. If the EC
and the EP are unable to reach an agreement, then progress toward an
investment agreement may be stalled or halted altogether.
Even so, potential disputes between the EC and the EP are not entirely
negative. Because the EP is elected directly by the EU people through
universal suffrage, key decisions may be more equitable and democratically
accountable. 44 Thus, affording the EP a co-decision-making authority may
result in decisions that better reflect the interests of the EU people and not
45
just heads-of-state.
138. Id. at 11.
139. See Anderer, supra note 5.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. TFEU, supra note 61, at arts. 44, 50, 64. Article 64 of the TFEU effectively provides
power for a qualified majority to govern measures pertaining to capital investments, although
Article 44 states that any such restrictions may not discriminate based on nationality.
Moreover, Article 50 imbues the EC and the EP with substantial authority to carry out such
duties, including competence over investment policy.
144. See Anderer, supra note 5.
145. See Sebastian Kurpas, The Treaty of Lisbon How Much "Constitution" is Left?, Ctr. for
European Pol'y Stud., 147 CEPS POLIcY BRIEF, at 9 (Dec. 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=13 34072.
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Conversely, the EC may be in a better position to make such decisions
due to better institutional and governance capacity, whereas members of the
EP may not have such knowledge.146 Because Article 207 effectively barred
14
Member States from possessing a veto power in EU investment decisions,
it is unclear whether the EP's decisions will adequately reflect Member
States' needs or meet Member States' best interests. As a result, Member
States may act outside the centralized EU framework when their interests
are not represented. If Member States choose to take individual actions
instead of relying on a central EU authority, the EC and the EP would lose
legitimacy, and Lisbon's efficacy in standardizing EU investment would be
reduced.148
Adding to this complexity, EU international treaty-making, in practice, is
149
often very disparate and covers a wide variety of issues spanning the EU.
Prior to Lisbon, international investment was generally considered on a
national-and therefore smaller-scale.5o In taking competence away from
the Member States, the EC and the EP have been given a large
responsibility to standardize a series of non-standard investment
agreements.' 5' Yet, the EP's decisions may be politicized,152 and noneconomic considerations may be emphasized during the investment process,
even where it does not make sense to do so. 5 3 This increasing politicization
146. See id. at 11.
147. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, art. 9(D)(5), 20. This provision does not automatically go
into effect; rather, it requires a unanimous vote by the Council; Pollet-Fort, supra note 76, at 12
("This meant that any national parliament of a Member State discontent with the provisions of
a chapter could veto the agreement in its entirety.").
148. Pollet-Fort, supra note 76, at 3. ("The increased role given to the EP in the EU trade
policy may therefore contribute to increased politicization of future trade negotiations leading
to uncertainties and possible delays in getting a trade agreement through.").
149. Lorenza Mola, Which Role for the EU in the Development of InternationalInvestment Law?
(Society of International Economic Law, Working Paper No. 26/08, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers. cfm ?abstract id= 115458.
150. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at 8.
151. Id. at 7 8 (There is evidence that the EU is moving towards operating as a regional unit.
For instance, on September 12, 2011, an EU-wide investment doctrine was entered into with
Singapore, India, and Canada. Though these collective EU BITs generally resembled BITs
entered into by individual nations, many scholars have suggested that the EU-wide BITs will
include "preambular references to corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental and
social issues."); U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Investment Policy Monitor No.6, A Periodic
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 8 (Oct. 11, 2011), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia
201 ldl2_en.pdf.
152. Pollet-Fort, supra note 76, at 15 ("The increased role of the European Parliament may
lead to a 'politicization' of the Common Commercial Policy and the use of conditionality in
trade policy made be reinforced.").
153. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A
NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012) [hereinafter
REPORT 2012]. Moreover, increased transparency and absolute standards should be applied to
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and unifying the EU investment regime makes
this increasingly possible.
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may detract from the future progression of the EU investment regime,
154
especially the aim of "liberalization" of trade flows.
A key consideration for the future will be to develop a mechanism in
which to break deadlocks, or at the very least, increase harmonization
between the EC and the EP so they are able to adequately represent the
needs of the Member States and EU as a whole. 155 Additionally, allowing for
EP input may lead to significant delays in coming to a decision, and thus
impose a temporal deadline in which a decision must be made may likewise
be beneficial.56 Though not a panacea, such implementations will help
buffer the transition to an exclusive competence framework.57
In sum, shifting from a shared competence model to an exclusive
competence regime will likely increase uncertainties and result in a struggle
for control between the EC and the EP, especially if the two entities are
dissimilar in thought.58 On the one hand, this shift may lead to an increased
chance for deadlock, as the EP may continually block an investment
negotiation it does not agree with wholesale; on the other hand, the
transition to a co-decision-making function may result in the EU investment
regime becoming more democratic and representative of EU investors. 59
While only time will bring forth the practical effects of this change, much
will rest upon the personalities and egos in the EP, as well as its similarities
in thought and policy aims with the EC.160
Although the CCP should be "guided by the principles and objectives of
the Union's external action more generally, including the promotion of the
rule of law, human rights and sustainable development" as delineated under
Article 205 of the TFEU, the EC and the EP must ensure that acting to
achieve these objectives does not lead to political deadlock.161 Despite
attempts to reach a common goal, the EC and the EP may fail to reach an
154. See, e.g., Roger Goebel, Supranational? Federal? Intergovernmental? The Governmental

Structure of the European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon, 20 COLL M. J. EL R. L. 77, 138 (2013)
(discussing opposition by smaller nations to the creation of an EU President, the author notes)
("Presumably the smaller State political leaders were concerned that a longer Presidential term
[influence by the President] would give greater weight to the views of the larger States.").
155. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at
10. This is consistent with the EU's policies in following the provisions set forth by the VTO,
which is looking to promote a policy of openness and transparency.
156. Id. (The EU Energy Charter is a good example of present negotiations.); Jean-Francois
Brakeland & Colin Brown, Presentation at the European Comm'n Civ. Soc'y Dialogue
Meeting, The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on trade policy, 2-7 (Jan. 27, 2010), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc 145757.pdf.
157. Anderer, supra note 5, at 875.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at 9.
Because the Lisbon Treaty aims to create an overarching treaty that governs numerous facets of
European legalities, the invocation of these issues also suggests that its drafters sought to
increase the consideration given to these issues in its BITs. Thus, this suggests that extra-EU
BITs will be more likely to contain provisions expressly forbidding, for example, pressing
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agreement based solely upon the technicalities of achieving this aim, to the
detriment of the EU investment regime, and consequently, a dispute
resolution mechanism should be created to resolve impasses and prevent
political agendas from dominating the EU investment regime.162
5.

Lisbon Will Likely Increase FDI Flows and Promote Efficiency, but May
Lead to Negative Externalities

Centralization of EU investment policies is likely to cause a
regionalization of FDI flows both in the EU and globally. These regional
investment blocks are likely to further foster cross-border investments.163
Despite the conflicts that may arise due to the shift in power among the
EC and the EP, as well as loss of authority of the Member States, Lisbon's
standardization of EU investment policy may increase FDI.164 Given that
the EP may also be actively considering numerous other political, moral, and
social objectives, infusing investment policy with the EP's overarching
agenda could decrease efficiency, transparency, and predictability because
new concerns the EP must grapple with arise without predictability and
without knowing their effects upon investment.165 Accordingly, the shift to
exclusive competence may simultaneously increase negative externalities as
the EU CCP aims to synthesize EU investment policy with overarching
issues pertinent to the European community as a whole.166
Because FDI constitutes a major component of European GDP, bringing
FDI into the domain of the exclusive EU competence, through Article 207
of the TFEU,167 may increase ease of market access. 168 Given its sheer
magnitude and the financial implications, FDI is most effectively regulated
at the EU level, especially given that the EU may pool resources from the
environmental concerns, such as dumping in certain areas or to prevent investment in an area
out of political aims.
162. THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY, 277 78
(eds. Martin Trybus & Luca Rubini, 2012). By allowing the consideration of non-economic
factors, the EU will bring in its investment policy to align with its overarching goals.
Additionally, by allowing for greater access of dispute settlement proceedings, the EU will
promote transparency and improve perceptions of legitimacy of the dispute resolution system.

163. Anderer, supra note 5, at 875 ("NVhile the transfer of competence over FDJ from the
individual EU Member States to the EU creates a number of problems, if these problems are
adequately dealt with, then the changes to FDJ embodied in the Lisbon Treaty will represent an
improvement over the EU's prior international investment regime.").
164. See id. at 875 ("All these changes to bring trade in goods and services and FDJ under the
exclusive competence of the EU are expected to contribute to a streamlining of the trade
policy."); see also Pollet-Fort, supra note 76, at 3.
165. See id. at 854.
166. See Anderer, supra note 5, at 874.
167. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 2, art. 207.
168. Impacts of EU Outward FDI on EU Economy, EUROPEAN COwu'N. (last visited Aug. 10,
2017). http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/june/tradoc-146273.pdf.
From 2001 to
2006, outward FDJ alone has increased the GDP of the EU by over 20 billion.
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Member States.169 Moreover, though the development of a centralized,
stable investment policy is not the exclusive determinant of FDI flows both
into and out of the EU, it does serve to increase transparency, efficiency, and
mitigate instability.' o But while FDI flows will most likely increase as a
result of the foregoing, FDI flows may also face downward pressures due to
the rise of a host of exogenous and non-economic considerations. 171 Thus,
these increased regulations will likely increase the costs of investing
internationally.' 2
While the EU is currently a strong force in global FDI flows, comprising
nearly half of all FDI worldwide, European FDI flows has recently been
13
It is
steadily losing ground per relative standing in the world market.
unclear whether the changes brought by Lisbon will halt the backward slide
of the European market. 1 4 During Europe's retreat, third-world nations,
such as China, India, and Brazil, have been profoundly altering the global
investment commonplace, demanding renewed consideration of both the
investment opportunities within their borders, as well as these nations'
strengthened capacities to invest in Europe.'71 Such third-world nations,
often referred to as "emerging market" economies, have been steadily

169. See id.
170. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at
6 7 (The value and role of outward FDI has been hotly debated by EU and non-EU nations
alike, though most nations generally cede that inward FDI is worth attracting. But outward
FDI will likely provide value to the EU as well. For instance, Copenhagen Economics states
that the number of jobs going abroad generally represents only between zero point five percent
and two percent of the total number of jobs leaving the nation. Moreover, for every onehundred jobs that move overseas, about fifty of the jobs were newly created altogether. Panel
economists undertook a study in which they analyzed the effects of outward FDI on the EU
economy, and determined that outward FDI leads to increases in productivity and efficiency of
EU companies thus increasing their competitiveness on the global marketplace. 'While the
US and EU continue to promote outward FDJ, many other nations have undertaken measures
to curtail such investment in the belief that these resources should instead be developed
domestically.); see also Eva R. Sunesen, Svend T. Jesperson & Martin H. Thelle Impacts of EU
Outward FDI, COPENHAGEN ECON., at 5 (May 20, 2010) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
20 10/june/tradoc_1462 70.pdf.
171. Id.
172. REPORT 2012, supra note 153, at 81.
173. Id. at 169.
174. See id.
175. Victor Mosoti, BilateralInvestment Treaties and the Possibility of a MultilateralFramework on
Investment at the World Trade Organization:Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 Nw. J.
INT'L & Bus., 95, 113 15 (2005) ("Most African countries now do everything in their power to
create an environment that is conducive to FDI, which represents a tectonic shift from
prevailing autarchic thinking of the 1970s. The vast majority of these countries now universally
welcome foreign investment almost unreservedly, have signed many BITs and have heavily
engaged in negotiations, especially those sponsored by UNCTAD.").
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increasing in global FDI.176 Foreign investors may be reticent to invest
177
when they view EU's investment regime to be unstable.
Regarding EU outward FDI flows, EU investors may be wary of investing
in developing nations that may not have the capacities or infrastructure to
deal with the externalities associated with development, such as
environmental waste or human displacement.' 7 Accordingly, investment
agreements should incorporate mechanisms to help these nations address
industrial externalities by including, for example, provisions where the
investor will assist with environmental mitigation.'79 By incorporating
environmental and other "soft" considerations in investment agreements,
weaker nations may enjoy increased investments while reducing exposure to
harmful externalities. 80 Of course, the EU may likewise want to include
environmental and human rights provisions for outside investors investing
81
within its borders.'
Moreover, the centralized EU investment control may also change the
way investment agreements are drafted. Most-favoured nation (MFN)
clauses are frequently featured in investment agreements such as BITs.82 In
a BIT, a MFN clause "means that investments or investors of one
contracting party are entitled to treatment by the other contracting party
that is no less favourable than the treatment the latter grants to investments
or investors of any other third party."'183 In particular, the MFN and
176. See id.; Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note
106, at 3.
177. Anderer, supra note 5, at 875 ("If foreign investors believe that the EU's system does not
provide adequate protection, they may choose to retract their investments. This will make it
difficult for the EU to attract new foreign investors who will likely forego opportunities in the
EU to avoid the problems associated with an unstable investment regime.").
178. REPORT 2012, supra note 153, at 82.
179. See U.N. Env't. Programme, The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, art. 5, 25 (2000) https://unep.ch/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf
(Montreal Protocol instilled time-adjusted regulations for meeting Protocol provisions based
upon the unique needs of developing nations.).
180. Goebel, supra note 154, at 86 ("As successive Treaty amendments have authorized social
and employment policy, environmental protection, consumer rights and other fields of action,
the [EC] has promoted each with equal vigor on a Community[-]wide basis through action
programs and initiatives for legislation."); see also Philippa Watson, EU SOCIAL AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE, 66 68 (Oxford
University Press, 2009).
181. Goebel, supra note 154, at 86.
182. See UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT
RULEMAKING, at 93, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/I2006/5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.JJ.D.16
(2007). Consequently, the MFN clauses for each individual BIT should be drafted with
particularity, while the EC should perhaps formulate a 'model' MFN clause as a default
provision. Moreover, the 'model' MFN clause should be drafted with the weaker nations'
specific needs in mind. For example, an MFN clause may propose that standards of treatment
are to be considered from the view of the weaker nation, or that a particular dispute (in some
instances, and admittedly not all) be resolved as against the nation most capable of dealing with
the consequences.
183. Anderer, supra note 5, at 859.
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national treatment provisions continue to carry crucial importance in
investment agreements in order to ensure that weaker nations-both EU
and non-EU-receive the same protection as the stronger nations.184 No
longer should MFN provisions be based upon a relative standard of an
individual nation. Instead, new clauses such as post-admission "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full security and protection" may come to possess
new significance as they become increasingly utilized to develop a threshold
standard for investor protection that carries across nations.185 Previous
national BITs are unlikely to serve as a model for incorporating such
protections. For example, the German Model Treaty, in Article 3(1) and
3(2),186 does not provide for exceptions in areas where a local industry or
group may need special preference in order to develop or sustain itself.187
Such a need, as described above, is necessary due to the endemic inequalities
between the Member States in their industrial capacities. 188
Despite the move toward unified investment agreements, these
agreements may need to be drafted in a more flexible manner to allows its
provisions to be interpreted in the interest of fairness, especially as it
pertains to weaker nations.189 Increased flexibility accords with GATS, Part
IV, Article XIX, which provides that "[t]here shall be appropriate flexibility
for individual developing country Members for opening fewer sectors,
184. Ross Eventon, Future Forms of EU Investment Competence: The German Model BIT as a
Minimum Level of Protection, in RECLAIMING PUBLIC INTEREST IN EUROPE'S INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT POLICY, EU INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN LISBON TREATY ERA: A READER, 22

(Ross Eventon ed., Kate Wilson trans., 2011), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/
S2b%20investment%20reader%20-%2050%20pages!.pdf.
185. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106 at 8,
11. But in achieving these aims, the EU should work to ensure that investors receive, at the
very least, equal treatment as to that which they received under the BITs by individual Member
states. This is a tall aim though vital to ensuring a strong reception to increased EC
competence and will require collaboration between the EC and the Member states. In order
to secure increased cooperation between the EC and the Member states, binding statements
should be secured to ensure the open flow of investment and the maintenance of standards of
care. Such standards should be developed in accordance with the 'best practices' by the
Member states. Moreover, in the interim, stand-alone investment negotiations should continue
to be available as a transitional mechanism.
186. German Model Treaty 2008, art. 3, Federal Ministry for Economics and Technology
(2008), italaw.com/documents/2008-GermanModelBIT.doc; Eventon, supra note 184, at 22.
("The National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation provisions restrict states from taking
measures to enhance local production or enterprise for fear of breaking this provision.").
187. Eventon, supra note 184, at 22. An example of an industry which may need special
treatment in order to survive would be the US automobile industry, which would likely have
collapsed after being unable to compete with foreign manufacturers.
188. Armand De Mestral, "Is A Model EU BIT Possible Or Even Desirable?" COLUM. FDI
PERSP. No. 21 (Value Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, Mar. 24, 2010), http://
academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac /3A125914.

189. "Investment," Trade Topics,

EUR. CozMzv'N,

Armand De Mestral, "Is A Model EU BIT

Possible Or Even Desirable?" COLUM. FDI PERSP. No. 21 (Value Columbia Center on
Sustainable Development, Mar. 24, 2010), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac
%3A125914 (last visited Aug. 10, 2017).
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liberalizing fewer types of transactions, [and] progressively extending market
access in line with their development situation .
*.".."190
Even more, an argument may be made that the EU is not yet sufficiently
unified to create a single investment agreement for all of its Member States.
Some nations, fearing loss of their autonomy over international investment
policy, have begun taking measures to restore their former control. The
United Kingdom's (UK) recent referendum vote to leave the EU is a recent
example of backlash against further EU integration efforts by the Member
States. 191 After leaving the EU, the UK will once again assert complete
control over its investment policy.192 In doing so, the UK will need to
negotiate new trade agreements, including free trade agreements and
bilateral trade pacts with developing nations. 193 The UK will also lose access
to the single European market and will consequently seek to redraw its trade
194
policy with the EU.
This recent backlash is but one indication that the EU is not sufficiently
unified at this point in time to draft, oversee, and implement a single
uniform investment policy. Tellingly, many individual Member States
continue to enter into investment treaties separately, suggesting that the
pace of EU investment unification has slowed or stalled. 19 The
inconsistencies between EU individual national investment policies and EU
investment policies may present to the world a confused image, as these
policies may overlap or contradict others.196 Increased instability in EU
investment policies may reduce FDI flows if such inconsistencies are not
rectified. 197 Moreover, the authority of the individual Member States to act
on international investment issues-or even to what extent the Member
States retain control over their own domestic markets-remains ambiguous
after Lisbon.198 This area will continue to present a tricky dichotomy as the
EU considers the rights of the Member States and the Union, without
depriving either of opportunities for growth. 199 Finally, replacing the over
one-thousand individually created BITs and transforming them into a
common body of European investment law is an extensive undertaking that
will likely take decades to complete.200
It remains unclear whether Europe will be able to consolidate its
investment policies into a single series of investment agreements. 201 Recent
190. GATS, supra note 103, Part IV art. XIX.
191. See Jean Heilman Grier, Brexit: Trade Implications, 16 11

BRIEFING

(discussing Brexit and future trade policy options for the UK).
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1.
194. See id. at 2.
195. See id. at 1.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.

200. De Mestrel, supra note 188, at 1-2.
201. Id. at 1.
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backlash by EU Member States suggests that such consolidation may be an
elusive task.
6.

Consolidation of EU InternationalInvestment Will Promote Public
Policy Goals

Public policy initiatives in Europe strongly favor consolidation of its
international investment framework. Trade and investment consolidation is
likely to improve business relations with non-EU nations and promote
regional unification and economic modernization within Europe.202
Moreover, Lisbon's effects on the EU's investment policy will likely benefit
its relationship with key partners, including the US, with which its
investment flows are most substantial.203
European policymakers have stated the EU seeks to transition into a
"smart, sustainable, and inclusive economy."204 Though at the outset it
appears the shift toward an EU-centric model will unjustifiably promote EU
investment interests, this shift in power is unlikely to be Lisbon's legacy.205
Instead, the implementation of exogenous and non-economic considerations
in international investment law may ease tensions between the EU and
foreign investors, and place increasing importance on social issues that
previously did not take precedence in investment agreements. 206 While the
transaction costs associated with investments may increase in the near term,
over time, the move to a common investment framework and
standardization of key human rights, social, and environmental issues will
likely promote investment stability.207
Moreover, an EU central investment framework is likely to solidify the
EU's relationships with key nations, including the US, its largest investment
partner. 208 To date, the EU and US have repeatedly affirmed their
commitment to an open investment policy between each other, and the
move toward a centralized EU investment policy will facilitate increased
trade between the two regions, especially as non-discriminatory policies that
202. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at 3.

203. Id. at 9.
204. Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable

and Inclusive Growth, COM/2010/2020 final. (In so doing, the EU is looking to modernize its
labor force, technologies, and infrastructure. The EU seeks to lower its unemployment rate,

particularly among older workers. Increasing FDI flows will have the ramifications of
increasing employment rates, at least, this is the hope of the EU. Additionally, increased
investment will force the EU to modernize its economic and physical infrastructure
as

increasing investment, both inward and outward, will hopefully cause EU companies to become
both more competitive and more efficient.).
205. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at 9.
206. Id. at 11.

207. Id. at 9.
208. USA-EU InternationalTrade in Goods Statistics, EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/USA-EU_-_international trade in goods-statistics (last visited
May 4, 2017).
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"provide

investors clear guidance" on investment restrictions are
increasingly employed.209
Cultivating stronger investment relationships with longstanding
investment partners provides a straightforward avenue for bolstering existing
investment. 210 In particular, the EU and US are each other's biggest
investor.211 Specifically, in 2007, the EU stock of FDI in the US totaled
C1043 billion, while the US FDI stock in the EU was C1030 billion,
representing roughly one-half of each other's total FDI.22 EU investment
policies generally align with those of the US, perhaps more so than nearly all
nations. The EU and US's shared investment goals were demonstrated in
April 2012, when the EU and US jointly issued their "Shared Principles for
International Investment," describing their goal of providing a "level playing
field" and creating "open and non-discriminatory investment climates" for
investors between the two nations.213 Buoyed by support from EU and US
international investment policies, the rise of interjecting non-economic
factors, such as human and laborer rights, climate change, and workforce
issues, are likely to play a greater role than ever before in international
agreements. 21 4 Demonstrating the rise of "soft" factors, there are already
numerous current non-binding guidelines on point suggesting non215
economic considerations will be increasingly taken into account.
Interjecting "soft" factors into investment agreements also fits generally into
the aims under Article 205 of the TFEU, which provides for the creation of
'
general policies for "human rights and sustainable development."216
It is unclear whether a consolidated EU investment policy will promote
investment flows to and from the EU and third-world nations, especially
emerging countries that lack a longstanding relationship with the EU.217
209. EU-US Open Investment Statement, Trade, EUROPEAN COMVi'N (May 13, 2008), http://

trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/may/tradoc 13882 1.pdf. Both the EU and US openly
seek to avoid protectionist mechanisms, and consequently allow for the free flow of trade, with
the exception of national security issues.
210. Id.
211. European Commission Press Release MEMO/09/118, Global Partners: EU-US Trade and

Investment (Mar. 18, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-09-118_en.htm?
locale=en.
212. Id.
213. Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared Principlesfor International
Investment, Trade, EUROPEAN COIMM'N, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tra
doc_149331.pdf. Notably, some of these exogenous considerations are invoked in the
statement, including the promotion of ethically responsible behavior by businesses.
214. See id.
215. REPORT 2012, supra note 153, at 91.
216. Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 106, at 9.
217. Consultation on the Future Investment Relationship Between the EU and China, Trade,
EUROPEAN COMM'N (May 2, 2001), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc147866.pdf. In fact, it is quite difficult to see how the EU's relationship with China will develop
in the future, given that China does not share the same penchant for exceedingly liberal trade
flows, nor is it a democratic society. Other nations, in crafting their future relations with the
EU will likely fall somewhere on this continuum, with those nations sharing the most political,
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Perhaps the best strategy for the EU is to keep investment flows between the
EU and third-world nations as open and transparent as possible.218
Nonetheless, once the EU exits the field of common-market adherents,
whose ideological and political views may differ from those of the EU,
providing for a more effective and efficient dispute settlement mechanism in
the event of investor disputes will most likely be the best method to maintain
relations and continue investment.219
Consequently, after the Lisbon Treaty, the European investment
landscape has fundamentally changed. Instead of the over one-thousand
individual BITs entered into by the EU Member States,220 non-EU investors
may perhaps look to a single, overarching EU Model BIT and EU-wide
international investment policy decisions. Investment agreements will be
more transparent and efficient.221 After consolidating its investment
framework, if the EU can afford protection for the autonomy and
particularized needs of its Member States, investment to and from Europe
could be facilitated to a greater extent than ever before.222 If implemented
correctly, economic and trade relations with third world nations will only be
improved.223 Shifting the control center of the European investment regime
to the EC and the EP aligns with the EU's political goals and aptly
demonstrates the continent's capacity to unify to promote welfare for all
Europeans, regardless of the Member State to which they owe allegiance.

IV.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Lisbon is likely to change EU international investment
policy significantly. Non-economic considerations, including human rights,
climate change, and sustainable development are likely to be featured more
prominently in investment policy decisions. The shift to a centralized
framework will likely affect EU international trade flows positively and may
increase FDI. Moreover, public policy factors suggest that changes brought
about by Lisbon are likely to improve investment relations with the US and
other third nations, while simultaneously promoting market access and
investment stability in cross-border transactions. The Lisbon Treaty aims to
increase the transparency, efficiency, and unity of the EU political and
economic system. By initiating the steady decline of BITs conducted by the
Member States in favor of a common investment regime, Lisbon is slowly
fulfilling its goals.
economic, and social commonalities with the EU most likely to benefit from Lisbon's changes
to the EU's investment regime.
218. "Investment," Trade Topics, supra note 189.
219. REPORT 2012, supra note 153, at 97.
220. "Investment," Trade Topics, supra note 189.
221. Id.

222. See id.
223. See id.
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Appendix A
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LISBON FRAMEWORK
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3.
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